In the weeks preceding Euro 2024, a late Troy Parrott winner to get John O’Shea off the mark in his so far tortuous (not to be confused with torturous) spell as interim Ireland Head Coach was about as much as fans and players alike had to shout about. Two fixtures which, in reality, served little function other than to get many punters’ dark horses, Hungary, as well as Euro 2016 winners, Portugal, warmed up for the 2024 edition in Germany. Combine this with the Irish Premier League contingent’s season having just ended, in contrast with the likes of Sammie Szmodics whose impressive season in the Championship reached its conclusion exactly a month before the first fixture of the June window – this mix of tired legs and rustiness was hardly the recipe for two classic performances.
Nevertheless O’Shea, once again acting as a stopgap for the FAI in their now eight (!) month long search for a permanent boss, was tasked with getting the most out of an injury-hit squad. Missing key men such as Evan Ferguson and Chiedozie Ogbene, Ireland’s alternative offensive options needed to step up to the mark. Adam Idah, coming off an impressive loan spell with Celtic, did just that to put Ireland 1-0 up against Hungary after an excellent cross by Will Smallbone.
A key element in O’Shea’s tenure, at least in attack, has been in his own words ‘mixing it up’ and playing to the team’s strengths – something that was clearly on display in the March fixtures when Ireland sought not to overcomplicate things and use the physical strength of Ferguson to quickly advance up the pitch. Idah naturally serves as a more than capable deputy in the Brighton man’s absence when it comes to this element of Ireland’s game plan. As previous articles have mentioned, the nature of international football means that Ireland’s attacking strategy does not need to solely revolve around playing through the thirds and walking the ball into the net, it just needs to be effective, purposeful and ultimately fruitful, built on solid foundations. It’s no surprise then that when two particular Robbie Brady crosses failed to reach an Irish head, O’Shea could be seen confidently applauding his team.
The Hungarians had succumbed to the traps in Ireland’s press and the Boys in Green looked to quickly utilise the gaps that were subsequently made available to punish their opponents.
Those components of Ireland’s press- moving from a mid-block to an aggressive, higher press as a result of triggers such as a loose or backwards pass as well as forcing the opposition into wide zones and forcing errors- have clearly been key in Ireland’s out of possession strategy under O’Shea.
Essentially, when opponents are in the early phases of building up Ireland will look to remain in a compact mid-block, preventing central access and limiting space between the lines, i.e. zonal defending.
The aim is to force the team in possession backwards where they can then spring into a more aggressive press, isolating the player in possession in deep areas by ‘locking on’ to his team mates, i.e. man-to-man defending, and then winning the turnover.
When the ball can’t be forced backwards, Ireland look to entice it to wide areas where the wing back will instantly press, trying to win it back or force an error.
It has been apparent though, particularly since the game against Switzerland, that teams have figured out how to use this wide pressing trap that Ireland deploy to their advantage. The Swiss consistently overloaded the midfield and wide areas while pinning the wing backs, making Ireland’s tactic redundant and allowing Murat Yakin’s side to advance up the field while forcing the Irish back.
Both Hungary and Portugal, who had clearly spotted this chink in the Irish armour, were more direct once they created these gaps. Within two minutes of the first game there were early warning signs and it proved to be a trend throughout the the whole 180 minutes of the window.
The first thing that happens here is, as intended, Ireland entice the opposition wide.
Ireland are presented with an issue, however, when an opposition player deeper in the wide channel looks to ‘pin’ the ball-side wing back, therefore preventing him from stepping up and pressing the receiver.
This can then create space between the lines as Ireland’s midfield tries to shift across and presents a dilemma for the centre backs; if they step up to pressure the spare man a large gap will be left in the last line…
…and if they stay there will be a man free to receive with time to take advantage of the space, as the central midfield duo of Cullen and Smallbone rush across to attempt to plug the gap.
With the defensive line now retreating and the two central midfielders already relatively high by design, both Portugal and Hungary will feel wasteful having not punished Ireland when they found themselves with ample space in extremely dangerous areas.
The other way this tactical set up is getting exploited is, as presented by the Swiss in March and alluded to above, through the use of overloads. Switzerland often opted to overload and then progress in a more measured fashion, which is in stark contrast to what we saw in this window. Marco Rossi and Roberto Martinez clearly identified this as a key area to hurt Ireland and seemingly instructed their teams to be ruthless when these scenarios were created.
Hungary instructed star man Szoboszlai to drop into the wide areas and to use his technical ability to take advantage of the time and space afforded to him. In the first example, with Szmodics tucked in to protect the central channels, the double movement of Adam Lang and Liverpool’s number 8 leaves Robbie Brady in no-man’s-land as he is initially outnumbered 2v1.
This affords Szoboszlai time to receive, turn and pick his head up, playing the ball in behind an out-of-shape Irish backline.
Portugal were able to create similar situations.
Both of Ireland’s opponents were able to create high quality chances as a result of targeting this apparent weakness in the system. Using Expected Goals as a metric, it shows that the quality of chances that Ireland have conceded has been trending upwards in the four games that O’Shea has used the 5-2-3 formation. It also shows the growing disparity in chances created vs chances conceded by the team.
While the obvious quality of Portugal in particular can’t be ignored, and Expected Goals shouldn’t be the only measure of performance, the data does serve to further highlight what we’ve seen in the footage – and the latter points to a key area where many of these chances have occurred.
So what’s the potential solution? It’s a complicated question as: 1) the identity of the new manager is still unknown, it may be John O’Shea or it could be a new, more experienced manager with a different system or way of defending and 2) the 5-2-3 of course isn’t the sole reason for Ireland’s problems. Though, at least tactically, this article has shown it has led to big problems. If O’Shea was announced as the permanent head coach, he may well work with his backroom staff to fix this issue and stick with this system, or change it altogether. If there was a change in system, ideally it would be one that could be implemented relatively seamlessly given Ireland’s next fixture is in the Nations League against England in September. The change would need to focus on preventing the high quality chances conceded in wide areas while also improving Ireland’s threat going forward.
One solution could be switching to a 4-3-3 formation. This would provide extra bodies in the middle of the park, where at times Ireland looked particularly bare in the June window. It would mean sticking with a front three, and giving someone like Will Smallbone extra licence to get forward, or even dropping Sammie Szmodics into a more central ’10’ role in possession. It would of course mean a man less in defence, though this could be somewhat offset by playing a more defensive-minded full-back on one side.
What it would hopefully fix, most importantly, is the wide area in Ireland’s out of possession play. In the initial stages of defending an opposition’s build up, Ireland could set up in a 4-3-2-1 shape where the wide forwards tuck in, focusing on blocking central areas and funneling the ball out wide.
The tweak in the pressing trap would be that rather than it being the wing back’s responsibility to press the receiver, this job is left to the widest of the three central midfielders on the side to which the ball is played. Ireland’s full back on that side would primarily have to worry about picking up the spare wide player, which negates the ‘pinning’ tactic that teams have been using. The central midfielder, dedicated to protecting the space in front of the back four, would pick up the player between the lines, while the third midfielder to his left would shift across and pick up any other spare players, negating the overload issue Ireland have had.
Another window has ended and we are no closer to knowing who the next permanent head coach will be. John O’Shea, as always, has been incredibly professional while deadlines have been failed to be met by the FAI. In his first role as a number one he has shown not just his ability to coach but also his presence as a manager on the touchline and in the media. The main tactical story of his four games so far, however, has been an excellent out-of-possession strategy against Belgium which has been identified and picked apart one-by-one by more seasoned coaches in the proceeding fixtures. You can forgive O’Shea for having to learn on the job, and if he is chosen for the role you’d back him to fix these issues, however this window has once again shown the desperate need for experience at this level.
Images taken from Independent.co.uk and Totalfootballanalysis.com. Footage taken from Wyscout. Data taken from Fotmob and FootyStats.